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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

1ST OK CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MORRIS H. CURTIS and SADIE
P. CURTIS, his wife; and UTAH
TITLE & ABSTRACT CO., a Utah
corporation,

No. 14334

Defendants and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Plaintiff brought an action to specifically enforce
the terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Defendants Curtis

counterclaimed, asking that the contract be rescinded because
of the fraudulent representations and the fraud practiced upon
them by the President of the Plaintiff Corporation.

Defendant

Utah Title and Abstract Company agreed to be bound by the order
of the Court regardless of the outcome respecting the other
parties and no other affirmative relief xvas asked against it.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.

The jury entered a general

verdict and special interrogatories in favor of. the Defendants
Curtis and thereafter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment was entered by the Court in favor of Defendants Curtis

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants Curtis seek to have affirmed the verdict
of the jury and the judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We do not disagree with the summary statement: of
facts of appellant.

However, we believe the facts must

be supplemented to give the Court a basic understanding
of the matter.
BUSINESS EXPERIENCE AND BACKGROUND OF DEFENDANTS CURTIS
Defendant

Morris H. Curtis was a farmer (TR335)

who supplemented his income as a delivery truck driver
for Premium Oil Company (TR336).

He had very limited

business experience and had never had the services of
a lawyer (TR336).

He had never had a real estate trans-

action where he was the seller (TR336).

When he purchased

his farm property, the transaction was handled by a Sevier
County Abstracter whom he thought to be the Sevier County
Recorder (TR337).

He was never acquainted with any real

estate broker (TR337).

He does not know how to read real

estate descriptions or how to compute acreage (TR343).
Sadie P. Curtis, wife of the Defendant Morris H.
Curtis, had little formal education.

She finished the

ninth grade and then was forced to leave school because
of critical injury.

She was in a coma for a period of

•, - 2
~ :-:".:
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six months and then was blind and paralized for two
years (TR413).

She had no business experience.

When

she and her husband acquired a lot for the purpose of
building their home, they exchanged a house trailer for
it and the seller, her husband's uncle, took care of the
property transfer (TR414).

The farm purchase was handled

by a Richfield Abstracter (TR414).

She didn't know any

lawyers or any real estate brokers (TR414).

Mrs. Curtis

has health problems which place severe limitations on
her ability to transact business. She has a heart problem
and high blood pressure.

Tension or pressure or excitement

cause a complete loss of memory.
don't remember.

In her words, "I just

I just blank." (TR415).

NEED FOR ASSISTANCE AND PRELIMINARY INDUCEMENTS BY BUYER
The Curtises own 250 acres of land in Salina Canyon
which was bisected by Interstate Highway 170 and upon
which the Salina Freeway Exchange is now built (TR337).
Prior to roadway construction, the Curtises were aware
of the freeway activity and had seen surveyors on their
property (TR338).

They were aware of many problems in

developing freeway frontage and knew they were not able
to cope with them without assistance.

The Curtises knew

that they "were going to have to have some help*to
disburse of our property11 (TR338) . They knew their
property was valuable but had no idea as to the extent
-

3 -
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of its value (TR338).

Orland Fiandaca, President of

the Plaintiff 1st Ok Corporation, first contacted the
Curtises in December of 1971 or early January 1972.
The exact time is in some dispute.

He spent over

five hours (TR334) telling the Curtises of the
problems in highway development and of his experience
and ability to develop highway property (TR431).

He

said his services would make them financially .
independent.

Curtises would be able to get a

condominium in Hawaii and wouldn't have to work the
rest of their lives (TR391 and TR417).

Fiandaca

informed Curtises that he was well acquainted with
the Governor of the State of Utah and the State Road
Engineer and was in close contact with them and could
get whatever easements were needed to develop all of
the Curtis property (TR342).

It was at this time

Curtises decided, "This is our man, a man who could
help us with the disbursing of our property" (TR341).
Fiandaca presented to Curtises an arrangement by
which Curtises agreed to grant to 1st Ok Corporation
an option for $100.00 which would allow 1st Ok Corporation to acquire 50 acres of land for $1,000.00 per
acre.

The option was on the express condition that

Fiandaca would represent Curtises and develop their
remaining property so that it could be sold (TR391) .
Curtises would not have sold the land for the price
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A

mentioned without the additional consideration (TR341),
ORIGINAL CONTRACT PREPARED BY BUYER
Fiandaca then wrote the option agreement in his
own hand which tied up 50 acres of property for a
period of one year for $100.00 consideration,

Mr,

Curtis suggested going to a lawyer, but Fiandaca
told him he had bad experience with lawyers and
that he was capable of drawing up a contract,
Fiandaca also informed Curtises that he had a title
and trust company that would handle the matter for
them (TR342 and 343). Mr. and Mrs. Curtis understood
the title company "would be protectors" (TR343)f
SECOND CONTRACT PREPARED BY BUYER
After the initial option prepared by Fiandaca
was executed in December of 1971 or early January,
1972, Mr, Fiandaca came back to the Curtises on or
about January 21, 1972 and informed them that the
State Highway was going to condemn approximately 38
acres of land he had under option,

Fiandaca informed

them that this left him only about 12 acres to develop
and that he wasn't in a position to represent them in
developing their property unless additional land was
added to his contract for his benefit.

Curtises then

agreed to add an additional 20 acres to the option
agreement (TR345).

A discussion was had concerning the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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purchase price (TR391),

It was agreed that the

price would be $65,000.00 for the original 50 acres
plus 20 acres or a total of 70 acres.

However,

Fiandaca wrote the new contract to include 90 acres
rather than 70 acres (TR224, 345, 346, 354, 368, 419
and 421).

Because of the dependency the Curtises had

on Fiandaca for services he was going to render, the
Curtises agreed to a price of $65,000.00 for the 70
acres (TR346 and 347).

Fiandaca then wrote the option

contract and the real estate description (TR346 and 352;
Exhibit 41).
ADDENDUM TO SECOND CONTRACT
At a later date Fiandaca contacted the Curtises
and said he had heard that they were not satisfied with
the $65,000.00 purchase price.

The Curtises informed him

that they were not satisfied because they felt they should
have $1,000.00 per acre for the land in the option agreement.

Thereafter, the option contract was amended by an

addendum to include an additional $5,000.00 for a total
purchase price of $70,000.00 (TR352 and 353).

Curtises

were never aware of the fact that the contract (Exhibit
41) included 90 acres of their land until the time of
pre-trial (TR367 and 368) , The Curtises would not have
signed the agreement if they had known 90 acres of their
land was described (TR368).

After the second preliminary

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Clark Law
School, BYU.
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contract of January 21, 1972 (Exhibit 41) was
prepared by Fiandaca in his own hand, it was
signed by all of the parties,

Thereafter

Fiandaca exercised his option and a uniform
real estate contract and trust agreement were
completed (Exhibits 41a and 42) and the Curtises
conveyed their property to Utah Title and Abstract
Company on January 3, 1973 (TR359 and 360),

The

Curtises were paid the down payment less the $100,00
option consideration which was returned to Fiandaca
as a credit on the payment (Exhibit 43) r
MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTY RETAINED BY SELLERS
After receiving the down payment on the property,
the Curtises had frequent contact with Fiandaca in
which he kept them informed on what he was doing to
"manage'* their property (TR347) , Mr. FiandacaTs next
payment under the contract was due January 3, 1973,
Fiandaca contacted the Curtises and requested an
extension of time for payment.

The Curtises refused

to grant the extension since they were negotiating to
buy other grazing property for their cattle (TR362 and
363),

The payment was not made.

The Curtises waited

thirty (30) days and then contacted an attorney'for
the first time.

A notice of default was given pursuant

to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract and no
-

7' -
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payment was made within the grace period (TR363,
364 and 365)<

After notice of default and demand

for reconveyance (Exhibit 80) was given to Fiandaca
and the Utah Title and Abstract Company, the Utah
Title and Abstract Company refused to reconvey to
the Curtises but at the request of Fiandaca conveyed
all of the Curtis road frontage property to 1st Ok
Corporation without prior notice to Curtises (TR312,
313 and 314).
FACTS DISCOVERED BY DEFENDANTS CURTIS AFTER DEFAULT
IN FIRST SCHEDULED PAYMENT
Thereafter, the Curtises learned the following
facts which were never previously disclosed:
(a)

Orland Fiandaca had not described 70

acres of their property in the option contract which
he had prepared (Exhibit 41), but had inserted a
description for 90 acres (TR224, 345, 346, 354, 368,
419 and 421).
(b)

Orland Fiandaca had secured the release

of a tract of the Curtis land on December 15, 1972
and prior to execution of the uniform real estate
agreement and had sold the property for approximately
$20,000.00.

Only $10,000.00 of which was delivered

to the Curtises as the down payment (TR360).
(c) The release of that initial tract of land
landlocked property owned by Curtises to the South (TR361).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(d) Fiandaca had taken out personal bankruptcy which bankruptcy proceedings were closed in
October, 1971 (TR254) a few months prior to negotiations and entering into the option agreement with
Curtises (TR194).
(e) Orland Fiandaca had previously operated
a corporation known as the Container Corporation which
had become bankrupt (TR193),
(f) The 1st Ok Corporation was organized and
the only contribution to capital was $1,000.00 and a
part of the $1,000.00 was used for organization
expenses (TR200)..
(g) The 1st Ok Corporation had lost its charter
for failure to file reports and returns required by the
State of Utah (TR190, Exhibit 84),
(h) Fiandaca did not properly represent the
Curtises in negotiations with the Utah State R.oad
Commission or \<j±th other agencies and did not reserve
private easements which could be used to service the
remaining property retained by Curtises; specifically;
(1) Fiandaca obtained from the State Road
Commission access openings of 50 feet for property
acquired by him under the purchase agreement.

The

accesses granted to Curtises for other property owned
by them and fronting on the access road were only 16
feet in width.(TR349),
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(2)

Curtises' property remained

zoned

agricultural while Fiandaca procured a zone change for
his property to highway commercial (TR361 and 148).
(3) Under the lot release provisions in
the Fiandaca contract a selection was made of the entire
land which fronted on the highway and landlocked the
balance of the property owned by Curtises,

See Exhibit

88 (TR222).
(4) Fiandaca borrowed funds for his own
benefit on the Curtis property and executed two mortgages on Curtis land (TR233 and 368).
(5) Fiandaca sold options on parcels of
the property being acquired from Curtises and did
receive cash option consideration in excess of
$6,000.00 while he made no attempt to assist with
sales or marketing of the remaining Curtis property
(TR369 and 370).
(6) Fiandaca had negotiated with the
Utah State Road Commission and secured a payment
of $500.00 per acre on the land in which he had an
interest and identical land which was retained by the
Curtises was condemned and the Curtises were paid
$200.00 per acre (TR350 and 351),
Upon learning the true facts, the Curtises
counterclaimed against the 1st Ok Corporation to
rescind the contract because of the fraud practiced
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in

upon them by Orland Fiandaca, President of the buyer
company.

•
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON THE ISSUE OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP:
1.
2.

THE ISSUE WAS RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS.
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED DURING TRIAL
REQUIRED THE INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN.

1.

THE ISSUE OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS.

Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
states the requirement for pleading as follows:
n

(a) CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. A pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, cross-claim or third-party
claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for judgment for the relief to which
he deems himself entitled.,f
The foregoing rule has been reviewed by this Court
on several occasions.

In Burr vs. Child,!

Utah 2d 199, 265

p. 2d 383 the Court wrote:
"Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
for the most part taken from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, (28 USCA) a
pleader is required only to make a short
and plain statement of his claim, U.R.C.P.
Rule 8(a), and the requirement of technical
exactness is excluded. Fine detail is not
required. Porter v. Shoemaker,
Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495,

D.C., p. 51. . In
67 S.Ct.
385,
388,

91 L.Ed. 451, Mr. Justice Murphy, discussing
the Federal rules, said:

-
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"The pre-trial deposition-discovery
mechanism established by Rules 26 to
37 is one of the most significant
innovations of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Under the prior
federal practice, the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issueformulation and fact-revelation were
performed primarily and inadequately
by the pleadings. Inquiry into the
issues and the facts before trial was
narrowly confined and was often
cumbersome in method. The new rules,
however, restrict the pleadings to the
task of general notice-giving and invest
the deposition-discovery process with a
vital role in the preparation for trial."
This court also considered pleading requirements in
the

c a s e of

Wilson

vs.

Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362,

267 P.2d

759.

At

issue was the question of whether malice had been alleged
in connection with the request for punitive damage.
Justice Crockett wrote for the Court:
"Particularly under our new Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rule 8A U.R.C.P.) a statement of
ultimate fact is sufficient and it is unnecessary to set forth in detail the conduct,
the language or the artifices used to accomplish the result."
The legal term "confidential relationship" or
"trust" or "fiduciary" or "trustee" or "constructive
trustee" are all words describing a legal conclusion
or a legal relationship which result from a certain
state of facts and from which certain legal rights
and obligations result.
American

Jurisprudence

2d.

This matter is covered in
§8

pleading

on page 460, w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g

in Volume 61 Am Jur

statement:

12Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2d.

"It is unnecessary to plead presumptions
of law, inferences, or facts necessarily
implied from other facts stated. A pleading which avers facts from which the law
presumes another fact sufficiently pleads
that other fact. What is clearly implied
is as much a part of the pleading as what
is expressed. Like a presumption of law,
an inference need not be pleaded.11
Defendants Curtis in paragraph four of their counterclaim stated:
"That the 1st Ok Corporation, a Utah Corporation, by and through its President,
Orland Fiandaca, falsely made the following
representations to induce Defendants to
enter into said contracts and the Defendants
reasonably relying thereon did enter into
said contract, which misrepresentations
were:
(a) Orland Fiandaca, President of the
1st Ok Corporation did represent that his
company was a corporation under the laws
of the State of Utah and was therefore a
good buyer, financially sound and able to
guarantee all of the performances and
payments due under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract dated the 15th day of December,
1972.
The 1st Ok Corporation has no assets
with which to guarantee payment or performance of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract identified and as a matter of
fact has made sales of parcels of
Plaintiff's property in advance for the
purpose of securing payments due.
(b) That Orland Fiandaca, President of 1st
Ok Corporation informed the Defendants that they
should not go to an attorney, that attorneys were
expensive and the Defendants would be properly
secured by the contract which was drafted in
accordance with his instruction and further

that he would take the Defendants to
Utah Title and Abstract Company,
specialists in real property matters
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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who would make certain that the
Defendants were adequately secured
and would suffer no financial injury
or damage. Upon the inducement so
made, these Defendants did execute
the Trust Agreement attached to
Plaintiff's Complaint marked Exhibit
"B" and did convey their property to
Defendant, Utah Title and Abstract
Company; that Utah Title and Abstract
Company did not undertake to represent
these Defendants or to secure them from
economic or financial loss; that in fact
they only administered the Uniform Real
Estate Contract already prepared by the
Plaintiff which agreement permits a
substantial reduction in the value of
Plaintiff's security because property can
be selected at random by Plaintiff and
sold to third parties and the limited
proceeds required to be paid for partial
releases are applied on accruing payments due under the contract; therefore,
Plaintiff selects valuable parcels of
land and has said parcels conveyed to
said third parties and do thereby
substantially decrease Plaintiff's
security interest.
(c)
Orland Fiandaca, President
of
Plaintiff
Corporation
did represent
to these Defendants
that
he was an expert in developing
commercial
property
and that he would effectively
negotiate
with the
State of Utah and all other interested
persons
to
make certain
that adjoining
property
retained
by
these Defendants
would be substantially
increased
in value; that he would see that the State of Utah
granted suitable
access rights
to a proposed
interstate highway so that Defendants1
adjoining
properties
could be developed
for commercial
purposes.

That P l a i n t i f f has not r e p r e s e n t e d t h e s e
Defendants in said n e g o t i a t i o n s i n any manner
or attempted to secure access r i g h t s or
attempted t o a s s i s t t h e s e Defendants in p l a n ning t h e i r p r o p e r t y for commercial development.
( d ) That Plaintiff
through its President
did
further
represent
that it would reserve
adequate
easements and access rights
to and from the
interstate highway for the benefit
of Defendants'
adjacent
property.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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That no attempt has been made to
reserve easements and rights-of-way
for Defendantsf benefit.
(e) Orland Fiandaca, President of
Plaintiff
corporation did further represent to the Defendants
that he would reserve for their benefit all gas,
oil and mineral
rights.

That in fact, the Plaintiff did cause
the Defendants to convey all of their gas,
oil and mineral rights to the trustee and
it further executed instruments conveying
gas, oil and mineral rights to third parties
who have purchased parcels of property from
the Plaintiff by reason of the lot release
provisions contained in Exhibit "A".
Each of the foregoing allegations demonstrate that
Orland Fiandaca did hold himself out to be an expert in
drafting legal documents, planning and managing freeway
properties and in dealing with real estate; that Defendants
Curtis did rely upon him completely to draft a legal
instrument and make such arrangements as would accomplish
their purposes of security, property management and for
development of their property and sale to third parties.
The Plaintiff was instructed by the Court to prepare a
pre-trial order (TR3).

He did not finalize the order.

Therefore, the Defendants

Curtis submitted a pre-trial

order (R45 through 47) prior to the trial in which the
issues submitted to the jury were specifically* set out
as follows;
"5.

The following are the issues of fact
to be tried:

(a) Did Plaintiff's President, Orland
Fiandaca, induce Defendants Morris H, Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis into entering into the
agreement to sell their property by false
representations, and if so, what were those
false
representations?
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(b) Did Fiandaca and his corporation
or either of them hold themselves out as
being capable of performing and willing to
perform and, in fact, undertake and agree
to furnish professional and expert services
and advice in evaluating, classifying,
zoning, obtaining accesses for, marketing,
determining the accurate amount of acreage
of, offering for sale and selling real
property for commercial development and
whether or not Curtises in reliance upon
that representation and in reliance upon
Fiandaca or his corporation holding themselves out as willing and able to perform
those services relied thereupon in execution
of the several contracts and Fiandaca and his
corporation, having undertaken to do those
things and furnish that advice and services
failed to do so and thereby damaged Curtises,
(c) Did a confidential relationship
exist between Orland Fiandaca, President
of 1st Ok Corporation and Morris H. Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis?
(d) When was the payment due from
Plaintiff on January 5, 1974, made to
Defendants, Morris H. Curtis and Sadie
P. Curtis or their agent? . . *
6.

The following are issues of law to be
decided by the court:

(a) Have Defendants Morris H. Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis waived any deficiences
in the time and manner of payment of the
payment due from Plaintiff on January 5, 1974?
(b) Does Plaintiff have an adequate
remedy at law, and is it entitled to specific
performance?
— »
(c) Are Defendants Morris H, Curtis and
Sadie P. Curtis entitled to have their contract
with Plaintiff rescinded because of the fraudulent inducement of Plaintiff?
(d) Did a confidential relationship exist
between Orland Fiandaca, President of 1st Ok
corporation and Morris H. Curtis and Sadie P.
-
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Curtis and are the Curtises entitled
to have their contract with Plaintiff
rescinded because of a breech of
fiduciary trust by the Plaintiff?
(e) Are Defendants Morris H. Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis entitled to forfeit
the interest of Plaintiff in the real
property being purchased, or would such
forfeiture be unconscionable?
7.

Issues of fact will be submitted to the
jury by special interrogatories and general verdict form. Counsel for Plaintiff
and Defendants Curtis will submit their
proposed special interrogatories to the
Court before 10:00 A.M. on the morning of
trial."

The pre-trial order, instructions, special jury
interrogatories and general jury verdict forms were
all submitted to the court and to counsel for the Plaintiff
prior to 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the commencement of
trial.

Each of the instruments detailed the Defendants1

theory of the case.

Plaintiff did not request a continuance

and did elect to proceed to trial.
2.

THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED DURING TRIAL REQUIRED
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN.

We respectfully submit that the relationship between
the parties was set out by the facts pleaded in the
Defendants Curtis Counterclaim and also specifically
set out in the pre-trial order and the'request for
instructions and in the special jury interrogatories
and general jury verdict forms submitted prior to trial.
However, we are of the opinion that even if the pleadings
-
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had not covered the specific relationship of the
parties the facts in evidence at trial did in fact
prove a confidential relationship.

Under this

circumstance, the Court was required to submit
instructions to advise the jury on the burden
of proof on the issue of fraud..
This Court covered this question in considerable
detail in the case Of

In Re

Swan's

Estate,

4 Utah 2d

277,

293 P. 2d 682:

"Where a confidential adviser is made
the beneficiary in a will, receives
gifts or possible benefits from transactions with the person who relies on
his advice and counsel on such matter
in the making or execution of which he
actively participates, a presumption
of fraud and undue influence arises,
which shifts the burden of persuading
the trier of fact that there was no
fraud or undue influence."
This Court also stated:
"For reasons previously pointed out we
also reject the doctrine that this presumption is eliminated by a prima facie
showing to the contrary. After careful
study and consideration we conclude that
this presumption shifts the burden onto
the confidential adviser of persuading
or convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that no fraud
or undue influence was exerted, or in
other words, he had the burden of convincing the fact finder from the evidence
that it is more probable that he acted
perfectly fair with his confidant; thatr
me made complete disclosure of all material information available and took no
unfair advantage of his superior position.1'
-
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In Johnson

vs.

Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d

420

the

Court stated:
"In assaying the sufficiency of proof, the
plaintiffs here have significant help in
the rule that when a confidential relationship is shown to exist and a gift or conveyance is made to a party in a superior
position, a presumption arises that the
transaction was unfair.^ This presumption
has the force of evidence and will itself
support a finding if not overcome by
countervailing evidence. Therefore, the
burden was upon the defendant Calvin
Johnson to convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the
transaction was fair.^ if he failed to
do so, the finding to the contrary was
justified, and it will not be disturbed
on appeal unless the contrary evidence
was so clear and persuasive that all
reasonable minds would so find.
There can be no doubt that the existence
of a confidential relationship here of the
very kind for which the above rule was
fashioned. The evidence shows that his
father reposed great confidence in Calvin.
This is epitomized by his cooperating with
him in making final arrangements about his
property for the eventuality of death/1
In the case of Omega Investment

Co. vs.

Woolley,

72

u. 474, 271 P. 797, this Court said:
u

The confidential relation being shown
to exist, the burden devolved upon Woolley
to show that, in the making of the transaction, the fullest and fairest explanation
and communication was made to Baldwin of
every particular in Woolleyfs breast; that

•Omega Investment

Co. vs.

Woolley,

72 Utah 474,

271 P.

797,

quoting 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec, 956.
'•In Re Swan's

Estate,

4 Utah 2d 277,

~
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the transaction itself was fair, and the
consideration paid therefor adequate, before
a court is justified in permitting the transaction to stand,'1
The facts proved at the time of trial required the
Court to sumbit to the jury the issue of whether or. not.
there was a confidential relationship.

In the event the

jury found a confidential relationship did exist, the
Court was further required to instruct specifically
concerning the burden of proof required to be assumed by
the respective parties.
POINT II
DEFENDANTS CURTIS DID ALLEGE AND DID PROVE THE
ELEMENTS OF ACTIONABLE FRAUD.
Defendants Curtis d i d a l l e g e t h e e s s e n t i a l
of a c t u a l f r a u d a s s p e c i f i c a l l y
of

s e t forth

Pace vs. Parrish, 122 u. 141 f 247 p.2d 273,

elements

i n t h e Utah Case

The allegations are

contained in Defendants Counterclaim and in an amendment
authorized by the Court and included In the p r e - t r i a l
order.

The Plaintiff

acknowledges the additional

specific

claim of the Defendants Curtis which i s in paragraph 2
of the p r e - t r i a l order (R.45):
"2.
The Counterclaim of Defendants Morris
H. Curtis and Sadie P. Curtis is hereby
amended to show the date of execution of
the instruments described therein as Janu a r y 3 , 1973 and further amended to show that
Defendants
allege Plaintiff
represented
the
property
described
in the contract
of January 21, 1972
included
70 acres of Curtis land which representation
v/as
false
since the property
described
consisted
of
approximately
90
acres."
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The appellant made certain the jury fully understood the burden of proof upon Defendants Curtis in
connection with their allegation of common law fraud.
In addition to having the Court instruct specifically
thereon in Instruction No. 17 (R.79), the Plaintiff
did have the Court submit the following Special
Interrogatory No. 5 (R.86) which was Plaintiff's
requested Instruction No. 1:
"We the jury, find from a preponderance
of the evidence in this case the following
answers to the questions propounded to us:
(a) Prior to entering into the Uniform
Real Estate Contract whereby Plaintiff purchased real property from Defendants Morris
H. Curtis and Sadie P. Curtis, did Orland
Fiandaca, President of Plaintiff corporation,
make any representations concerning then
presently existing material facts?
ANSWER:

YES

If the answer to the previous question is
yes, answer questions B through F.
(b) Were said representations false:
ANSWER:

YES

(c) Did Orland Fiandaca, at the time of
such representations, know them to be false
or make them recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representations?
ANSWER:

YES

^

v

•••'.'(d) Were such representations made'for
the purpose of inducing Morris H. Curtis and
Sadie P. Curtis to act upon them?
ANSWER:

YES
-

21 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(e) Did Defendants Morris H. Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis, acting reasonably,
and in ignorance of the falsity of such
representations, in fact rely upon them?
ANSWER;

YES

(f) Were Defendants Morris H. Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis thereby induced to act
to their injury or damage?
ANSWER:

YES

Setting aside the consideration of the existing
confidential relationship and other acts of fraud,
the jury found a specific fraudulent representation
by Fiandaca which would be controlling.
The first option agreement prepared by Fiandaca
was torn up and rescinded by the parties on January
21, 1972 (TR346).

A second option (Ex.41) was prepared

by Fiandaca in his own hand on the same day (TR346).
He secured the signatures of the Curtises by representing
the real property description contained 70 acres and the
price was set on that basis.

The description did in fact

contain 90 acres.
The jury considered the matter under Interrogatory
No. 4 (R.85):
11

INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Do you find from
the evidence that on or before January
21, 1972 Mr. Fiandaca sought and obtained
an amendment to the previous agreement
between the parties by which amendment *
he obtained or would have obtained rights
in an additional 40 acres of land owned
by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis while failing to
disclose that fact or while representing
-
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to Defendants or allowing them to believe
Mr. Fiandaca was obtaining rights in only
an additional 20 acres of land?"
The jury answered "yes".
CONCLUSION
We submit the trial court did not error in instructing the jury concerning common law fraud or instructing
the jury separately concerning a confidential relationship.
The jury correctly found that common law fraud was
practiced upon the Curtises and did further correctly
find that a confidential relationship existed between
Orland Fiandaca, President of the 1st Ok Corporation,
and the Defendants Curtis and that Fiandaca breeched
the confidence imposed in him under that relationship.
We respectfully submit the general verdict and special
interrogatories of the jury and the findings of fact,
conclusions of lax? and judgment of the court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully

submitted,

TEX R. OLSEN
01 sen and Chamberlain
76 South Main
R i c h f i e l d , Utah 84701
Attorneys

for

Defendants-Respondents
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A. D. , 1976, two copies of the within and foregoing
Brief of Respondents, Morris H. Curtis and Sadie P,
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postage prepaid:
Mr. John H, Allen
Callister, Greene & Nebeker
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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